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1 Recent work has shown that a firm’s plural sourcing strategy, which determines how much it chooses to make
versus how much it chooses to buy, requires consideration of the complementarities and constraints that affect
the differential advantages of making and buying.  Elaborating on this perspective, we theorize how (mis)fit
between a firm’s plural sourcing strategy of simultaneously making and buying and its development of
information technology (IT) enabled interfirm and intrafirm process integration capabilities influences firm
performance in deregulated markets.  We position our theory development and empirical tests in the context
of the power-generation segment of the U.S. electric utility industry (EUI), an asset-intensive industry that has
been deregulated to promote the separation of key value chain activities (i.e., generation, transmission, and
distribution) and the development of wholesale energy markets.  We draw on the transaction cost economics,
coordination costs, and IT capabilities perspectives to theorize that a firm achieves fit (realizing performance
benefits) by increasing market sourcing intensity (MSI)—or, how much it buys relative to how much it makes—
and developing IT-enabled interfirm process integration capability for external coordination with the market,
or misfit (realizing performance penalties) by increasing MSI and developing IT-enabled intrafirm process
integration capability for coordinating internal production.  We collated data from archival sources for 342
utility firms in the power-generation segment to construct a panel dataset for the period 1994–2004 on
1Anandhi Bharadwaj was the accepting senior editor for this paper.  Sunil Mithas served as the associate editor.
The appendices for this paper are located in the “Online Supplements” section of the MIS Quarterly’s website (http://www.misq.org).
MIS Quarterly Vol. 39 No. 4, pp. 865-885/December 2015 865
Rai et al./Fit and Misfit of Plural Sourcing Strategies
(1) firms’ MSI from wholesale electricity markets, (2) firms’ IT investment decisions to develop interfirm and
intrafirm process integration capabilities, (3) measures of firm performance, and (4) several control variables
related to exogenous shocks (i.e., regulatory change, oil crisis), region of operation, and firm-level factors. 
Our results suggest that fit between MSI and the development of IT-enabled interfirm process integration capa-
bility improves firm profitability, assessed by return on assets, and misfit between MSI and the development
of IT-enabled intrafirm process integration capability extracts penalties in firm profitability.  We also find
evidence that fit between MSI and the development of IT-enabled interfirm process integration capability
improves market valuation, assessed by Tobin’s Q, and asset turnover, assessed by operating revenue/total
assets.  We discuss the implications of our findings for the development of IT capabilities to accompany a firm’s
plural sourcing strategy and the literature on IT business value. 
Keywords:    Plural sourcing, market sourcing intensity, IT-enabled process integration, IT capabilities, firm
performance, IT business value
Introduction
Plural sourcing, also referred to by some scholars as concur-
rent sourcing, involves a firm’s simultaneous use of multiple
modes of governance to source a good/service (Parmigiani
2007; Puranam et al. 2013).  It involves a firm making and
buying a good/service that entails splitting the total sourced
volume between internal production (hierarchical governance)
and markets (price governance).  A firm’s use of hybrid
governance that combines the market and the firm to source
the total volume of a good/service has developed as a broad
phenomenon across product–market contexts.  While most
theories of the firm have viewed the sourcing decision of a
good/service as a dichotomous make versus buy choice (Grant
1996; Williamson 1975), firms across diverse industries
including automotive (Gulati et al. 2005), banking (Jacobides
and Hitt 2005), machine tools (Parmigiani 2007), and fashion
garments (Jacobides and Billinger 2006) simultaneously use
external procurement and internal production to source the
good/service (Parmigiani 2007).
Given the misfit of the plural sourcing phenomenon with the
dominant theories of the firm that have concentrated on make
versus buy decisions, recent work in strategic management
has developed and tested explanations of a firm’s motivations
and benefits of making and buying, or plural sourcing, a
good/service (Gulati et al. 2005; Parmigiani 2007) and has
focused on understanding the complementarities and con-
straints that affect the effectiveness of plural sourcing
strategies, or how much to make versus how much to buy
(Puranam et al. 2013).  This recent work shows that plural
sourcing represents a way for a firm to simultaneously
monitor suppliers, produce efficiently, and improve perfor-
mance and that the effectiveness of plural sourcing strategies
depends on capabilities and constraints that are hetero-
geneously distributed across firms and not only on exogenous
transaction characteristics.
Although there is broad recognition that IT capabilities are
heterogeneously distributed across firms and are sources of
business value for firms (Aral and Weill 2007; Bharadwaj
2000; Bharadwaj et al. 1999; Melville et al. 2004; Soh et al.
2006), the role of IT capabilities in affecting business value
given a firm’s plural sourcing choices is unclear.  Past work
has shown that (1) interorganizational systems enable the
integration of interfirm processes and the coordination of
transactions in the market2 while intrafirm systems improve
the coordination of work activities within the firm (Morris and
Venkatesh 2010), (2) performance benefits of specific IT
capabilities are amplified or attenuated based on their fit or
misfit with governance choices (Mani et al. 2010), and
(3) interfirm IT capabilities enhance value cocreated in inter-
firm relationships when accompanied by relational govern-
ance practices (Rai et al. 2012).  However, the business value
of developing interfirm and intrafirm IT capabilities has not
been examined alongside a firm’s use of plural sourcing to
govern a transaction, leaving it unclear as to how a firm’s use
of plural sourcing can change the value of developing
interfirm and intrafirm IT capabilities.  We address this gap
by focusing on the following research question:  How does the
(mis)fit between a firm’s plural sourcing strategies and the
development of IT-enabled interfirm and intrafirm process
integration capabilities influence firm performance?
Our study is situated in the power-generation segment of the
U.S. electric utility industry (EUI), a critical, deregulated,
asset-intensive industry where aligning supply and demand of
electricity is essential for firm performance.  We introduce the
concept of market sourcing intensity (MSI), defined as the
2For example, interorganizational systems can enable electronic markets
(Choudhury et al. 1998), global service disaggregation (Mithas and Whitaker
2007), process integration in business process outsourcing (Mani et al. 2010,
Mani et al. 2011), supply chain integration (Rai et al. 2006), and customer
relationship management (Ray et al. 2005).
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extent to which a firm sources electricity through external
procurement relative to internal production, to represent plural
sourcing by a firm.  We build on the transaction cost eco-
nomics (TCE), coordination costs, and IT capabilities
perspectives to theorize fit, where a firm develops IT-enabled
interfirm process integration capability as it increases market
MSI, and misfit, where a firm develops IT-enabled intrafirm
process integration capability as it increases MSI.  We test
these ideas by collating data from archival sources for 342
utility firms in the power-generation segment and constructing
a panel dataset for the period 1994–2004 that included 6,685
IT investments decisions made by firms.  We find that the
proposed fit and misfit of IT-enabled process integration
capabilities with MSI explain firm performance above and
beyond either the IT capabilities or the TCE perspectives
alone.  By surfacing the interdependencies between plural
sourcing strategies and the development of IT capabilities, our
study contributes to our understanding about IT business
value, IT capabilities, and plural governance choices.
Investigative Context
The EUI is among the largest sectors of the U.S. economy,
with many sectors of the economy depending on it.  Approxi-
mately 7 percent of the U.S. GDP, or about $1 trillion, is
spent on energy, with retail electricity accounting for $350
billion of the energy market.3  The EUI’s well-defined value
chain activities (generation–transmission–distribution4) enable
us to specify and precisely measure the plural sourcing
transaction5 (i.e., power generation).  Moreover, the EUI was
deregulated to introduce competition in the generation of
electricity, to promote the unbundling of generation from
transmission and distribution, and to develop wholesale
markets by providing nondiscriminatory access to the trans-
mission system and increasing transparency of the bulk
transmission system.  These fundamental changes triggered
firms to reevaluate their single-source reliance policies and
made plural sourcing a salient managerial choice.
Importantly, electricity is the perfect commodity, removing
confounds of product characteristics, inventories, and logistics
for purposes of our theory development and research design. 
Unlike physical commodities (e.g., chemicals) whose attri-
butes vary in quality, grade, and logistics, electricity is
standardized, differing only in location, period of delivery,
and stability (Ku 2000).  Furthermore, as electricity cannot be
stored economically, its supply has to match demand at a
precise point in time to avoid shortages (Polk 2001).  Given
these product–market characteristics, a firm’s MSI (i.e., the
use of wholesale markets relative to internal power genera-
tion) along with its abilities to produce electricity internally
and to align demand with wholesale supply have been iden-
tified as factors that influence performance (Joskow 1989). 
As a result, the industry has witnessed rapid-fire IT inno-
vations not only for prediction of demand and coordination
and control of a firm’s internal production but also for
external coordination to dynamically align wholesale supply
with customer demand.  These innovations have triggered
firms to invest in the development of interfirm and intrafirm
process integration capabilities to coordinate external procure-
ment and internal production, respectively.
In sum, the EUI provides an ideal context to conceptualize
and measure a firm’s plural sourcing choice (i.e., MSI),
conceptualize and measure the development of two IT
capabilities—for internal production (i.e., intrafirm process
integration capability) and for aligning procurement from
wholesale markets with customer demand (i.e., interfirm
process integration capability)—and examine the conse-
quences of (mis)fit of MSI with the development of these two
IT capabilities.
Theoretical Development
Our research model and hypotheses are shown in Figure 1. 
The core idea underlying the model is that of discriminating
alignment between the development of IT capabilities and
changes in plural governance of a sourcing transaction:  fit
(misfit) of the development of IT-enabled process integration
capabilities with increases in MSI exacts performance bene-
fits (penalties).  This idea informs the two hypotheses, the
first representing fit between the development of IT-enabled
interfirm process integration capability and increases in MSI
that enhances firm performance and the second representing
misfit between the development of IT-enabled intrafirm pro-
cess integration capability and increases in MSI that decreases
firm performance.  The model recognizes that both costs to
transact in the market and costs to internally organize produc-
tion influence a firm’s sourcing choices (Masten et al. 1991),
3See CIA World Factbook (2011); Energy Information Administration Report
(Repice et al. 2012).
4Generation is the production of electric energy from other energy sources,
transmission is the delivery of electric energy over high-voltage lines from
the power plants to the distribution areas, and distribution includes the local
system of lower voltage lines, substations, and transformers that delivers
electricity to end-consumers.
5Measured as the proportion of electricity sold that is purchased in the
wholesale market vs. produced internally, consistent with Lieberman (1984)
and Jacobides and Winter (2005).
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Development of
IT-Enabled Interfirm
Process Integration 
Capability t
Firm Performancet+1
Development of
IT-Enabled Intrafirm
Process Integration 
Capability t
Market Sourcing 
Intensity t
H1 (+) H2 (-)
Note:  Control variables not shown for clarity.
Figure 1.  Research Model
specifically make-and-buy decisions or reliance on the market
versus internal production (Puranam et al. 2013), and the firm
can alter costs to transact in the market and costs to internally
organize production by developing capabilities (Puranam et
al. 2013), specifically IT-enabled interfirm process integration
capabilities to reduce costs to transact in the market and IT-
enabled intrafirm process integration capabilities to reduce
costs to internally organize production.
Market Sourcing Intensity
As Parmigiani (2007, p. 287) notes, “transaction cost econo-
mics has been intriguingly silent on the question of concurrent
sourcing.”  She observes that numerous empirical studies
grounded in TCE have collapsed plural sourcing choices to a
dichotomous make-or-buy decision by forcing the issue.  For
example, Monteverde and Teece (1982) define a firm’s
sourcing choice to be “make” when it produces at least 80
percent of its requirements and “buy” when it produces less
than 80 percent of its requirements.  Studies that have inte-
grated TCE and capabilities perspectives have also framed a
firm’s boundary choice of a transaction as a dichotomous
make-and-buy decision (e.g., Leiblein and Miller 2003; Steen-
sma and Corley 2001), thereby not considering the possibility
that the firm can simultaneously rely on both the market and
internal production to govern the same transaction.
We focus on understanding how firm performance is im-
pacted by the interactions of plural sourcing strategies—
defined as how much a firm chooses to simultaneously source
from the market and internal production (Puranam et al.
2013)—and the development of IT capabilities for interfirm
and intrafirm process integration.  We advance the logic that
a firm’s marginal returns from IT-enabled interfirm and intra-
firm process integration capabilities change with the extent of
reliance on the market relative to internal production to
govern a sourcing transaction.
As the conceptualization and measurement of governance
choices of a transaction requires defining the focal transaction
and the transaction’s scope in the value chain (Williamson
1985), we specify power generation as the focal transaction
and the transaction’s scope as spanning the generation and
transmission stages in the electricity value chain.  We
measure MSI as follows based on the megawatt-hours (MWh)
purchased versus internally generated by a firm:
(1)MSI MWhPurchased
MWhInternallyGenerated MWhPurchasedit
it
it it
=
+
where MWhInternallyGeneratedit = MWh generated
internally by Utility i in Year t
MWhPurchasedit = Electricity in total MWh
purchased by Utility i in Year t
As electricity cannot be stored efficiently and supply short-
ages can be compensated by wholesale purchases, the make–
buy ratio in net generation (proportion of the total output sold
by a firm that is bought on the market as opposed to internally
produced) is a good proxy for the extent of a firm’s plural
sourcing of electricity.  It corresponds to Parmigiani’s assess-
ment of plural sourcing of goods in the metal stamping and
power metal firms for producing tooling and services, where
she captured whether the firm was making, buying, or
making-and-buying and also the extent to which the firm was
producing the good internally if it was making-and-buying. 
It is also similar to Jacobides and Hitt’s (2005) measure in the
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Figure 2a.  Market Sourcing Intensity (MSI) Figure 2b.  Interfirm Process Integration
(Aggregate Across Firms)
Figure 2c.  Intrafirm Process Integration Investments
(Aggregate Across Firms)
• In 2001, we observe a decrease, on average, in MSI, accom-
panying the oil crisis and uncertainty in energy prices.
• Aggregate IT investments for intrafirm process integration
exhibit a general downward slope with some fluctuations when
they exhibit a positive slope.
• Aggregate IT investments for interfirm process integration
exhibit a cyclical pattern of decreases followed by increases.
Figure 2.  Trends in the Key Theoretical Variables Over Time
banking industry of a bank’s reliance on internal capacity
versus external sourcing of loan production (dollar value ratio
of loans produced by a bank through its internal branches to
the total dollar value of loans produced in a given year
including external brokers and other agents). 
Figure 2a shows the trend over time in MSI in the power-
generation segment of the EUI.  While firms, on average,
increased MSI in the duration of our study period, they
decreased MSI in 2001 in response to the oil crisis (Figure
2a), consistent with the expectation that firms increase
internalization of transactions and reduce reliance on markets
when there is an increase in supply uncertainty (Sutcliffe and
Zaheer 1998).  Furthermore, significant industry deregulation
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
encouraged the emergence of electricity wholesale markets,
which motivated firms to reevaluate how much power to
source in the wholesale market versus produce internally.6 
We next develop our logic for (mis)fit between the
development of IT-enabled process integration capabilities
and MSI and the implications for firm performance.
Interdependencies Between IT-Enabled
Process Integration Capabilities and MSI
In contrast to hybrid modes of governance where the total
volume of a good/service is procured from a single source by
combining characteristics of firms and markets (Gulati et al.
2005; Williamson 1991), plural sourcing allocates the total
sourced volume across the market and internal production
(Puranam et al. 2013).  By pursuing plural sourcing, a firm
incurs costs for internal production (e.g., capital, plant and
equipment capacity, staffing, and coordination) and external
procurement (e.g., searching, selecting, negotiating, con-
tracting, and monitoring suppliers) (Parmigiani 2007). 
However, the suggested benefits of plural sourcing include
compensating for the limitations of internal production by
capitalizing on cost advantages, reduced bureaucratic
obstacles, and flexibility of market sourcing (Parmigiani
6FERC Orders 888 and 889 implemented in 1996 required utilities that
owned transmission facilities to file open access transmission tariffs that
defined the terms and conditions of available transmission services available
to wholesale generators and to make this information available in real-time
through electronic means by way of an Open Access Same-Time Information
System (OASIS).  Order 888 also provided for the recovery of stranded costs
by public utilities, which arose as a result of deregulation.  This was to be
FERC’s first broad-sweeping effort to eliminate discriminatory and unfair
practices in the transmission system (Liggett et al. 2000).
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2007; Williamson 1975), and motivating and learning about
improvements in internal production by simultaneously
monitoring suppliers and internal production (Puranam et al.
2013).
Traditional explanations of a firm’s transaction boundaries,
particularly those explanations that rely only on transaction
costs analysis, provide a partial explanation of how a firm
sources a good and formulates make versus buy decisions.  As
per TCE, a firm’s governance choice is influenced by trans-
action costs—or the costs to coordinate and integrate acti-
vities in the market.  Although TCE considers the costs of
transacting in the market, it did not initially consider the costs
of organizing a transaction within a firm, or what Masten et
al. (1991) refer to as the costs of internal organization.
Remedying this omission, the subsequent TCE literature
emphasized that a firm’s governance choice is intended to
economize on costs of a transaction (Williamson 1999), and
the relative costs of coordinating the transaction internally
and in the market should influence governance choice.  The
TCE literature also suggests that the relative costs of coor-
dinating transactions internally or externally are influenced
not only by exogenous factors (e.g., regulatory shocks and
supply crises) but also by firm capabilities (Argyres 1999;
Jacobides and Winter 2005; Williamson 1999).  Moreover,
the factors that motivate a firm away from buying may not be
the same as the ones that motivate it toward making
(Parmigiani 2007).  Consequently, a firm’s capabilities to
coordinate a transaction in the market and to organize it
internally are distinct and should influence MSI.  By
extension, MSI should motivate a firm to invest in developing
capabilities to either coordinate a transaction in the market or
organize it internally.  This leads to a reciprocal relationship
between MSI and capabilities to coordinate a transaction in
the market and organize it internally.7  From an IT business
value perspective, this reciprocal relationship motivates an
assessment of how changes in MSI affect the business value
of IT-enabled process integration capabilities related to
sourcing a good/service in the market and internally
organizing production of the good/service.
IT-enabled process integration capabilities have been
examined in various contexts, for example, manufacturing,
procurement, production, marketing, business process out-
sourcing, supply chain management, and customer relation-
ship management (Bharadwaj et al. 2007; Gattiker and Good-
hue 2005; Mishra et al. 2013; Rai et al. 2006; Rai and Tang
2010; Ranganathan and Brown 2006; Ray et al. 2005).  A key
conclusion from this past work is that interfirm process inte-
gration capabilities reduce transaction costs in markets while
intrafirm process integration capabilities reduce organization
costs of internal production.  Differentiating between inter-
firm and intrafirm process integration capabilities, we define
interfirm process integration as the degree to which a firm
establishes digital connections with entities outside the firm’s
boundaries to coordinate transaction interdependencies with
them, and intrafirm process integration as the degree to which
a firm establishes digital connections among the resources and
activities in internal subunits and functions to coordinate
production interdependencies.  IT investments in supplier-
and customer-facing systems that enable a firm to align
supply with real-time demand can be used to develop the
interfirm process integration capability, and internal systems
to coordinate internally distributed production resources and
activities can be used to develop the intrafirm process inte-
gration capability.  In the EUI’s power-generation segment,
firms can invest in systems and technologies such as elec-
tronic data interchange and supply chain management systems
to coordinate activities with wholesale suppliers and in
systems and technologies such as automated meter reading
systems and customer relationship management systems to
coordinate activities with customers.  Firms can also invest in
systems and technologies such as supervisory data control and
acquisition (SCADA) to coordinate their internally distributed
production activities and resources for increased reliability
and efficiency in power generation.  Figures 2b and 2c show
the trends in interfirm/intrafirm process integration invest-
ments over time in the power-generation segment of the EUI. 
We now examine the (mis)fit between developing interfirm/
intrafirm process integration capabilities and MSI, and the
consequences for firm performance.
Conceptualizing Fit and Misfit of IT-Enabled
Process Integration Capabilities and MSI
Our conceptualization of fit is grounded in Williamson’s
(1999) view of discriminating alignment and is operation-
alized using Venkatraman’s (1989) typology of fit.  William-
son (1999, p. 1090) emphasized the need for theorizing how
a firm’s governance choices occur in the context of what he
describes as its “distinctive strengths and disabilities,” or
firm-specific capabilities.  He emphasizes the need for
matching a firm’s governance choices with its capabilities to
generate superior firm performance.  We build on William-
son’s (1999) notion of discriminating alignment and related
7Our conceptualization of reciprocal influence of MSI and development of
IT-enabled process integration capabilities is consistent with Markus and
Robey’s (1988) emergent perspective, where a dominant causal agency is not
ascribed to either the IT variables or the organization variables.  The emer-
gent perspective is in contrast to the technological imperative, where the
decision to develop IT capability (interfirm or intrafirm process integration)
precedes decisions to change the extent of plural sourcing (IT is super-
ordinate) or the organizational imperative, where the decision to change
plural sourcing precedes the development of IT capabilities (IT is sub-
ordinate). 
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work (e.g., Nickerson and Zenger 2002) to understand the
(mis)alignment between a firm’s development of IT-enabled
process integration capabilities and its decision to increase/
decrease MSI.  Extending Williamson’s (1999)  idea that a
firm’s capabilities influence its costs of transacting in the
market and internally organizing the transaction, we suggest
that a firm achieves fit when an increase in MSI is accom-
panied by the development of IT-enabled interfirm process
integration capability and devolves into misfit when an
increase in MSI is accompanied by the development of IT-
enabled intrafirm process integration capability.  This concep-
tualization of (mis)fit is guided by Venkatraman’s notion of
fit as moderation that is appropriate when the variables
involved in the fit relationship have high specificity and the
interaction of the variables is posited as the primary deter-
minant of the variance in a criterion variable.  These
conditions match the specificity of our predictors and criterion
variables (i.e., MSI, the development of IT-enabled process
integration capabilities, and firm performance) and our theo-
rizing interactions among the predictors to explain variance in
firm performance. 
Fit Between IT-Enabled Interfirm Process
Integration Capability and MSI
A firm’s interfirm process integration capability provides the
firm with the ability to monitor partners’ actions, coordinate
resource flows and activities with partners, and reduce trans-
action costs (Bharadwaj et al. 2007; Rai et al. 2006; Rai and
Tang 2010; Robey et al. 2008; Subramani and Venkatraman
2003).  For example, the development of the B-2 “Stealth”
Bomber involved several hundred contractors who success-
fully used a centralized interfirm system to manage inter-
dependencies among the work activities of various contractors
(Argyres 1999).  This system provided the focal firm with a
mechanism to electronically observe the work of individual
contractors and to orchestrate the execution of distributed
activities.  Interfirm process integration capability can also
enable a firm to effectively synchronize supply with demand
and to offer customers novel services based on monitoring of
their real-time consumption, For example, CenterPoint
Energy, a Houston-based utility firm, decided to invest $640
million over a five-year period in automated metering systems
(AMS) to cover more than 2-million electric meters across its
5000-square mile electric service territory (Boone and
Hackeny 2009).  This system provides CenterPoint Energy’s
customers with granular consumption information that they
can track over the web.  Access to this information enables
customers to make informed consumption and energy conser-
vation choices and to act on these choices by remotely
operating thermostats and appliances.  It also provides
CenterPoint Energy with real-time consumption information,
enabling it to more effectively load utility assets, source in
wholesale markets, and serve customers (e.g., remotely
connecting and disconnecting services, monitoring outages
and responsively acting on them). 
Moreover, interfirm process integration capability can ensure
standards compliance in the absence of direct authority and
ownership to govern a transaction by automating the
enforcement of activity and output standards.  As a firm
organizes a greater proportion of a transaction in the market,
it loses direct authority, formal channels for information
flows, and bureaucracy that can be applied to govern the
transaction within the firm, thereby increasing external
coordination costs (Langlois 1992).  Developing interfirm
process integration capability can compensate for these
increases in external coordination costs and the lack of
observability of work done outside the firm’s boundaries that
accompanies increased MSI.  We therefore hypothesize com-
plementarity between MSI and the development of interfirm
process integration capability in enhancing firm performance. 
Hypothesis 1:  The marginal returns to firm perfor-
mance from developing IT-enabled interfirm process
integration capability increase with an increase in
market sourcing intensity.
Misfit Between IT-Enabled Intrafirm Process
Integration Capability and MSI
A firm’s intrafirm process integration capability provides the
firm with the ability to control and coordinate interdependent
tasks and activities across its internal subunits and functions
(Bardhan et al. 2006; Gattiker and Goodhue 2005).  For
example, Vineland Municipal Electric Utility, a New Jersey
based utility, is implementing a state-of-the-art SCADA
system (SourceOne 2014).  This system will establish a
central location to efficiently monitor the power generation
infrastructure and unexpected fluctuation in power generation
activities such as generation of energy from renewable
sources, emergency situations, equipment failure, and error
resolution.  The system is expected to improve operating
reliability as well as better manage distributed power gener-
ation.  Increases in MSI shift the onus to coordinating
activities across a firm’s boundary in contrast to decreases in
MSI where the firm faces a greater need to coordinate
activities within the firm (Masten et al. 1991).  As a result,
with increases in MSI, the costs of internally organizing a
transaction become less important vis-à-vis the costs of coor-
dinating it in the market.  Therefore, a firm is less likely to
realize performance gains from developing intrafirm process
integration capability when it increases MSI.  When a firm
invests in developing intrafirm process integration capability
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while increasing MSI, it misaligns the capability being devel-
oped with the increasing reliance being placed on the market
for sourcing a good/service.  As misalignment between a
firm’s capabilities and governance choice should exact perfor-
mance penalties (Williamson 1999),  we expect increases in
MSI to diminish the performance gains from developing
intrafirm process integration capability.
Hypothesis 2:  The marginal returns to firm perfor-
mance from developing IT-enabled intrafirm process
integration capability decrease with an increase in
market sourcing intensity.
The Empirical Study
Panel Dataset Construction
Our unit of analysis is the firm.  We constructed a panel data-
set using multiple archival sources of firm-year observations
for 342 major power-generation utility firms in the United
States.  These firms collectively produce about 80 percent of
the electricity in the United States.  The Department of
Energy (DOE), which oversees the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) and the FERC, mandates utility firms to
file various financial and operating reports with the EIA and
the FERC.  As part of the reporting mandates, firms are
required to report all significant IT and non-IT investments
undertaken as construction-work-in-process (CWIP),8 or fair
market value of assets developed, that year.9  Thus, CWIP in
the EUI represents the fair market value of investments by a
firm to develop its capabilities, and IT investments
comprising CWIP is a good proxy of the firm’s enacted
decisions to develop IT capabilities.
We extracted each firm’s financial and operational reports
filed with the EIA and the FERC between 1994 and 2004. 
Although firms are required to follow a uniform system of
accounts in filing reports, we detected a few inconsistent
descriptions in the reports filed by some firms.  We clarified
each inconsistency using phone interviews with the con-
formity officers at these firms.  We obtained missing financial
and accounting information from Wharton Research Data
Service (WRDS).  Through our collation of data from the
various sources, we developed a rich dataset comprising 6,685
significant IT investments made across firms in the 1994–
2003 period, internal generation and market sourcing of
electricity, and a range of control variables in the 1994–2003
period, and various performance measures in the 1994–2004
period. 
Coding Scheme for IT Investment Decisions
We use a firm’s IT investments as a proxy for its development
of IT-enabled process integration capabilities based on the
logic that investment size represents the emphasis by a firm
on developing a capability (Argyres 2011).  We developed
coding criteria to determine if an IT investment was directed
at (1) interfirm process integration, (2) intrafirm process inte-
gration, (3) standalone (or modular) intrafirm systems,
(4) standalone (or modular) interfirm systems, or (5) general-
purpose IT infrastructure.  Collectively, these types of IT
investments are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaus-
tive.  We also coded whether the IT investment was directed
at customizing IT.  Investments in standalone (modular)
systems, IT infrastructure, and IT customization are used as
controls.  The coding scheme is summarized in Table 1.  We
now elaborate on our three-phase process to code the IT
investments and validate the coding.
Phase 1:  Initial Classification
We first evaluated whether each IT investment was directed
at business processes or IT infrastructure (INFRA).  Subse-
quently, for investments in business processes, we determined
if the investments were in systems that integrate activities and
resources or in standalone systems.  We also classified the
investments that were directed at customizing IT resources. 
We then iteratively refined the coding scheme through tele-
phone interviews with IT industry experts, academic experts,
utility industry professionals, conformity officers at the utility
firms responsible for filing FERC reports, FERC officers
responsible for maintaining the FERC datasets, and reports
from IT vendors that provided the products and services to the
firms.  Next, two coders, one with a master’s degree in busi-
ness administration and information systems and the other
with a master’s degree in economics and international busi-
ness, were trained on the classification rules and coded the IT
investment descriptions for 1994–1995.  Their initial inter-
rater reliability for the coded 1994–1995 IT investments was
at an acceptable level of 94.5 percent (Neuendorf 2002).  The
differences in the coding results were discussed with con-
formity officers and plant engineers at a large Southeastern 
8The FERC’s reporting guidelines define a significant investment to be at
least 5% of overall CWIP or exceeding $100,000, whichever is less, and
require investments less than $100,000 to be grouped together as a single
entry.
9If an investment spans years (such as implementation of a SCADA system),
firms are required to use FERC Form 730 to provide granular investment
activity reports that break down fair market values across years.
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Table 1.  Coding Scheme for IT Investment Decisions by a Firm
Type of IT investment
 (Informing Sources)
Decision Rule Applied to IT Investment
Description Provided in Filed Reports Illustrative IT Investments
Development of Intrafirm
Process Integration Capability
(Barki and Pinsonneault 2005;
Bharadwaj et al. 2007; Rai et al.
2006; Saraf et al. 2007)
Is the investment in an integrated system
that coordinates internal production
activities (e.g., planning, monitoring,
and/or controlling)?  If yes, the firm made
a decision to invest in developing its
intrafirm process integration capability to
coordinate internal production.  
• Supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) system
• Integrated automated mapping and
facilities management (AM/FM) system
• Energy generation control system
Development of Interfirm
Process Integration Capability
(Rai et al. 2006; Rai and Tang
2010; Ross et al. 2006; Saraf et
al. 2007)
Is the investment in an integrated system
that coordinates activities with suppliers or
customers?  If yes, the firm made a
decision to invest in developing its
interfirm process integration capability to
coordinate supply with demand.  
a Is the investment in a system that
coordinates activities with suppliers?  
• Integrated supply chain planning 
• E-Procurement 
• Supply chain materials management  
• Supplier contract management
• Multi-vendor electronic data interchange
system 
b. Is the investment in a system that
coordinates activities with customers?  
• Automated meter reading system
• Meter rerouting system
• Energy delivery mobile system
• Customer order fulfillment system
• Customer service systems
• Client development system
c. Is the investment in a system that
coordinates activities with customers
or suppliers?  
• Electronic data interchange system
Intrafirm IT Modularization* 
(Baldwin 2008; Khanna et al.
1998; Rai and Tang 2010; Ross
2003; Saraf et al. 2007; Tiwana
2008) 
Is the investment in an autonomous,
function-specific IT system for an intrafirm
activity?  If yes, the firm made a decision
to invest in modularizing its intrafirm IT
systems.  
• Plant performance analysis 
• Burner management module
• Fuel management module
• Turbine control system
• Environmental data acquisition (with
Graphical/Visual Processing Unit)
• Transformer outage information system
Interfirm IT Modularization*
(Bala and Venkatesh 2007;
Malhotra et al. 2005; Rai and
Tang 2010)
Is the investment in an autonomous,
function-specific IT system for an interfirm
activity?  If yes, the firm made a decision
to invest in modularizing its interfirm IT
systems.  
• Customer billing module 
• Supplier performance analysis 
• Backup meter interrogation software 
• Reregulation requirements module
(added to customer information system)
IT Infrastructure* 
(Aral and Weill 2007)
Is the investment in hardware, databases,
and networks, and their interoperability? 
If yes, the firm made a decision to invest
in its IT infrastructure.
• Data integration/warehousing
• Integrated networking system
• Various operating systems
• Radio communication systems
IT Customization*
(Bharadwaj 2000; Klein and Rai
2009; Williamson 1991)
Is the investment in customizing
(including developing, enhancing or
modifying) the system to the unique
requirements of the firm?  If yes, the firm
made a decision to invest in customizing
its IT resources.  
• Custom development of a communication
system
• Development of fuel management system
• Custom integration of computer systems
*Specified as control variables in the models
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Systems).  After these clarifications, the coders recoded all of
the IT investment descriptions for 1994–1995 and achieved a
96.7 percent inter-rater reliability.  The coding of the IT
investment descriptions for the remaining years was allocated
evenly to the two coders.
Phase 2:  Interfirm Versus Intrafirm Process
Integration Capabilities
For investments in developing IT-enabled process integration
capabilities, we further classified IT investments as directed
at integrating intrafirm (INTRA) or interfirm (INTER) pro-
cesses.  We devised a coding scheme for this classification,
applied it to a sample of about 10 percent of the IT invest-
ments (700 investments), and refined the coding scheme.  We
then trained one of the coders to apply the coding scheme.  To
ensure the validity of the coding, we inspected all the coding
done by the coder for the first two years of IT investments
(1,400 investments) and detected only a few (20) minor
discrepancies; independently coded a random sample of about
20 percent of the IT investments in the remaining years and
found the coding done by the coder to be very accurate (12
discrepancies); and randomly inspected 20 percent of the
coded data once the coding was completed and detected only
a couple of discrepancies which were resolved through
discussion.
Phase 3:  Post-Coding Validation
We used three steps to evaluate the external validity of the
coding.
1. We conducted an in-person review with a senior IT
executive of a EUI firm of our coding decisions for 25 IT
investments at their firm.  These IT investments included
INTER, INTRA, INFRA and Customized/Generic invest-
ments.  The executive agreed with all our 25 coding
decisions.
2. We convened an in-person three-member IT executive
panel, representing three EUI companies.  We requested
the panelists to individually code 40 IT investments
(including INTER, INTRA, INFRA, and Customized/
Generic) into the types of IT investments that we had
defined and to discuss discrepancies in their coding deci-
sions with ours.  There was complete agreement among
the panelists with our coding decisions for 37 of the 40
IT investments including all our coding decisions for
INTER, INTRA and INFRA.  There was partial disagree-
ment among the panelists on two coding decisions related
to IT customization, with one disagreeing panelist ob-
serving that IT customization can accompany generic IT
investment but the customization of generic IT resources
may not be documented in a firm’s FERC filings.
3. We requested two IT executives at two EUI firms to code
the same set of 200 IT investments into the types of IT
investments that we had defined.  There was very high
agreement between the IT executives’ and our coding
(97.5 percent and 98.5 percent, respectively, with each of
the executives).  There was only one case where both
executives disagreed with our coding in that they coded
one IT investment as customized while we coded it as
generic.  Discussions revealed that a similar generic IT
system had been extended/customized at the executives’
organization but the FERC description that we coded did
not include this information.  In all cases where there was
disagreement between the executives’ and our coding,
discussions revealed that our coding was acceptable
given the level of description provided in the FERC
filings.
After the coding was completed, a firm’s investments in each
type of IT investment were aggregated to determine the
relevant firm-year IT investments for 1994–2003.
Construct Operationalization
Table 2 summarizes the measures for the theoretical con-
structs as well as the instrumental and control variables.  We
elaborate on these measures below.
Firm Performance:  We selected return on assets (ROA) as
our measure for firm performance.  As a measure of profits to
total assets, it reveals how effectively firms have used their
assets to grow profit levels (Tallon and Pinsonneault 2011). 
This is an especially appropriate measure of firm performance
for our study given the asset-intensive nature of the EUI and
our objective to understand how the extent of reliance on the
wholesale market relative to internal production for the
sourcing of electricity affects the value derived from IT
investments.  Furthermore, ROA is a broad measure of profit-
ability, correlates with other measures of profitability, and has
been widely employed in the IT business value literature (e.g.,
Aral and Weill 2007; Bharadwaj 2000; Rai et al. 1997).
MSI:  We measured a firm’s MSI in year t as the ratio of total
wholesale megawatt-hours purchased (the buy portion) to the
sum of net megawatt-hours generated (the make portion) and
purchased wholesale in that year (see Equation 1). 
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Table 2.   Operational Measures for the Variables
Variable
Operational MeasureName Type
Return on Assets (ROA) Criterion Net income divided by average total assets of a firm in a given year.
Market Sourcing Intensity (MSI) Predictor
Ratio of total wholesale electricity purchased by a firm in a given
year to the sum of net megawatt-hours generated internally and
purchased wholesale by the firm in a given year.
Development of Interfirm Process
Integration Capability (INTER)
Predictor
Total dollar amount spent by a firm in a given year on systems that
encompass multiple activities across the firm’s boundary with
customers and suppliers.
Development of Intrafirm Process
Integration Capability (INTRA)
Predictor
Total dollar amount spent by a firm in a given year on systems that
encompass multiple activities within the firm’s boundary.
Interfirm IT Modularization
(INTER_MOD)
Control
Total dollar amount spent by a firm in a given year on self-
contained, relatively autonomous systems that encompass activities
across the firm’s boundary with suppliers and customers.
Intrafirm IT Modularization
(INTRA_MOD)
Control
Total dollar amount spent by a firm in a given year on self-
contained, relatively autonomous systems that encompass activities
within the firm’s boundary.
IT Customization Control
Total dollar amount spent by a firm in a given year on customizing
systems to its unique requirements.
IT Infrastructure Control
Total dollar amount spent by a firm in a given year on its IT
infrastructure.
Supplier Concentration Control Herfindahl Index of supplier concentration for a firm in a given year.
Oil Crisis Shock Control Time elapsed in years since the oil crisis in 2001; 0 for t < 2001.
Depreciation Expense Control Depreciation expense incurred by a firm in a given year.
Firm Age Control Number of years since a firm’s incorporation.
Production Capacity Control Total production capacity in MWh of a firm in a given year.
Non-IT Construction Work-In-Process
(CWIP_Other)
Control
Total dollar amount spent by a firm in a given year on non-IT capital
work-in-process.
Deregulation Shock Control
Time elapsed in years since the deregulation shock by FERC Order
888/889 implemented in 1996; 0 for t < 1996.
Firm Location Control
Dummy variable for the principal NERC region of the state in which
the firm conducts business (firm location for states with more than
one NERC region coded separately).
Note:  All financial performance and investment numbers in 2003 dollars
Development of IT-Enabled Process Integration Capa-
bilities:  We aggregated a firm’s IT investments in year t (i.e.,
CWIP, or fair market value of the development projects
completed that year) to determine its development of intrafirm
process integration and interfirm process integration
capabilities in that year.
 
Measures for Control Variables:  We specified several vari-
ables pertaining to other IT investments, firm characteristics,
and industry events as controls, and measured them as we
now describe.
Other IT Investments:  We measured a firm’s investments in
IT infrastructure, standalone (modular) interfirm and intrafirm
IT resources, and IT customization in year t as these variables
can influence interfirm governance (Klein and Rai 2009;
Tiwana 2008) and firm performance (Aral and Weill 2007;
Bharadwaj 2000; Rai et al. 1997).
Firm Characteristics:  We measured firm age as the number
of years since a firm’s incorporation (Taylor and Fuller 1986);
production capacity as total megawatt-hours of electricity gener-
ation capacity of a firm in year t (Taylor and Fuller  1986);
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics
Variable Units
Firm-Year
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ROA t+1 Ratio 1164 0.05 0.06 -1.55 0.46
MSI Ratio 1544 0.32 0.31 0.00 1.00
INTER* 2003 dollars 1621 139.34 1920.97 0.00 45000.00
INTRA* 2003 dollars 1621 618.26 5055.25 0.00 108000.00
INTER_MOD* 2003 dollars 1621 629.37 3626.18 0.00 51400.00
INTRA_MOD* 2003 dollars 1621 1878.07 6406.73 0.00 99400.00
IT Customization* 2003 dollars 1621 1096.39 6819.98 0.00 136000.00
IT Infrastructure* 2003 dollars 1621 1681.75 6090.53 0.00 86700.00
Supplier Concentration Ratio 1201 0.42 0.33 0.02 1.00
Oil Crisis Shock Years since 2001 2408 0.53 0.98 0.00 3.00
Depreciation Expenses* 2003 dollars 2139 90100.00 184000.00 -3386.72 3140000.00
Firm Age Years 2150 63.71 34.85 0 191.00
Production Capacity MWh 1526 4215.71 14206.92 1.2 415001.70
CWIP_Other* 2003 dollars 1542 94200.00 156000.00 0.00 1170000.00
Deregulation Shock Years since 1996 2408 3.16 2.83 0.00 8.00
Notes:  *Indicates that the numbers are in thousands.
Table  4.  Correlation Matrix
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 ROAt+1 1.000
2 MSIa 0.072* 1.000
3 INTERb 0.082* -0.023 1.000
4 INTRAb -0.013 -0.044 0.030 1.000
5 INTER_MODb -0.010 -0.073* 0.086* -0.005 1.000
6 INTRA_MODb -0.054 -0.082* 0.049* 0.191* 0.039 1.000
7
IT
Customizationb
0.052 -0.035 0.196* 0.572* 0.130* 0.440* 1.000
8
IT
Infrastructureb
-0.006 -0.073* 0.041 0.083* 0.029 0.202* 0.300* 1.000
9
Supplier
Concentration
0.017 0.164* -0.042 -0.038 -0.077* -0.157* -0.050 -0.107* 1.000
10
Oil Crisis
Shock
-0.008 -0.031 0.027 -0.007 0.009 -0.062* -0.007 -0.024 0.060* 1.000
11
Depreciation
Expensesb
-0.034 -0.065* 0.220* 0.153* 0.248* 0.307* 0.281* 0.307* -0.330* -0.100* 1.000
12 Firm Ageb 0.124* 0.280* -0.006 -0.024 0.000 0.046 0.036 0.043 0.080* 0.010 0.081* 1.000
13
Production
Capacityb
-0.033 -0.246* 0.111* 0.171* 0.252* 0.257* 0.198* 0.235* -0.296* -0.030 0.659* 0.037 1.000
14 CWIP_Otherb -0.029 -0.113* 0.191* 0.144* 0.208* 0.273* 0.206* 0.292* -0.284* 0.026 0.655* 0.018 0.621* 1.000
15
Deregulation
Shock
0.001 0.029 0.015 -0.008 -0.027 -0.062* 0.010 0.005 0.032 0.800* -0.062* 0.009 -0.033 -0.026 1.000
Notes: a These variables are mean centered.
b These variables are standardized to z-scores. 
*p < 0.05
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depreciation expense using the reported depreciation in a year
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000); supplier concentration using
the Herfindahl index, computed as total wholesale purchases
by a firm from given suppliers in year t over the total whole-
sale purchase in that year (Rai and Tang 2010); and firm loca-
tion based on the eight region classification defined by the
North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC 2011).
Industry Events:  We measured deregulation shock using
years elapsed since the 1996 FERC Orders 888/889, which
represents a planned deregulatory shock with advance notice,
and oil crisis shock using years elapsed since the 2001 oil
crisis (popularly referred to as the Enron Crisis), which was
an unplanned shock (Puller 2007).
Analysis and Results
Descriptive Statistics
We present the descriptive statistics in Table 3 and the
correlations in Table 4.  We observe that the variables of theo-
retical interest—that is, ROA, MSI, INTER, and INTRA—
exhibit reasonable variance.  We also observe that INTER and
MSI significantly and positively correlate with ROAt+1.
Analysis Procedure and Model Specifications
We specify and estimate the following pooled OLS equa-
tions:10
(2)
ROA ROA MSI INTER
INTRA Controls
it it it it
it it it
+ = + + +
+ + +
1 0 1 2 3
4 5
β β β β
β β ε
(3)
ROA ROA MSI INTER
INTRA INTER MSI INTRA
MSI Controls
it it it it
it it it it
it it it
+ = + + +
+ × +
× + +
1 0 1 2 3
4 5 6
7
β β β β
β β β
β ε
where subscript i indicates firms, subscript t indicates time,
and git is the error term associated with each firm-year obser-
vation.  All independent variables are lagged by one year be-
hind ROA to decrease the potential for endogeneity (Greene
2000).  Equation 2 includes the main effects of MSI, INTER,
and INTRA and the control variables, and Equation 3 also
includes the interactions between MSI and INTER/INTRA.
We specified a number of control variables.  First, we con-
trolled for the effects of previous ROAit,11 as firm performance
can exhibit persistence and depend on the previous year’s
performance (Baum et al. 2000; Jacobson 1990).  Second, we
controlled for the following other IT investments:  intrafirm
IT modularization (INTRA_MOD) and interfirm IT modulari-
zation (INTER_MOD) as IT investments in relatively
autonomous systems can provide flexibility and enable the
development of higher-order capabilities, thereby affecting
firm performance (Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004; Rai et al.
2012); IT customization as investments in idiosyncratic
systems can be rare and hard to imitate, thereby being a
source of value (Klein and Rai 2009); and IT infrastructure as
investments in expanding a firm’s digital infrastructure are
capital-intensive and can be the basis for strategic capabilities
and value creation (Aral and Weill 2007; Rai et al. 1997;
Weill et al. 2002).  Third, we controlled for the following firm
characteristics:  supplier concentration as a firm’s perfor-
mance can be influenced by the concentration of its supplier
portfolio (Rai and Tang 2010); depreciation expense, firm
age, production capacity, and non-IT capital work in process
(CWIP_Other) as these variables can affect firm performance
(Ang et al. 2000; Core et al. 2006), and firm location based on
the NERC regional classification as industry clusters can
affect firm performance (Dayasindhu 2002).  Finally, we
controlled for oil crisis shock, which was an unplanned shock
(Puller 2007).12
In addition to including the above controls, we clustered to
account for within-firm correlation due to the nonindepen-
dence of investments in a firm and used robust standard errors
with correction for heteroskedasticity.  Where necessary, we
mean-centered variables to mitigate multicollinearity.  All
variance inflation factors and condition indices were well
below their respective recommended thresholds of 10 and 30
(Greene 2007), with the highest variance inflation factor
observed to be 4.69 and the largest condition index observed
to be 18.
10We followed recommended procedures to evaluate if random effects (RE)
or pooled OLS estimation is to be favored (Wooldridge 2002).  We used the
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test (the XTTEST0 command
available in the Stata software package) to evaluate the null hypothesis that
the coefficients estimated by the RE estimator are not systematically different
than those estimated by the OLS estimator (Breusch and Pagan 1980).  The
test failed to reject the null hypothesis, supporting our use of pooled OLS
estimation over RE estimation.
11Results are robust when we use an average lagged performance of the last
two or three years.
12Oil crisis shock and deregulation shock are highly correlated.  Although we
report results using oil crisis shock as a control variable, the results are robust
to our using deregulation shock instead.
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Table 5.  Pooled OLS Estimation Results 
Variables      
Dependent Variable = ROAt+1
Main Effects Model Interaction Effects Model
ROA
0.577*** 0.582***
(0.063) (0.062)
MSIa
-0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
INTERb
0.004*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000)
INTRAb
-0.001 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
INTERb × MSIa (H1 +)
0.011***
(0.003)
INTRAb × MSIa (H2 -)
-0.016**
(0.008)
INTER_MODb
0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
INTRA_MODb
-0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
IT Customizationb
0.002*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
IT Infrastructureb
-0.001 -0.001†
(0.001) (0.001)
Supplier Concentration
-0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Oil Crisis Shock
0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Depreciation Expenseb
0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Firm Ageb, c
0.001†   0.001†
(0.001) (0.001)
Production Capacityb, d
0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
CWIP_Otherb
-0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant
0.022*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.003)
R² 0.315*** 0.332 ***
∆R² 0.017***
Firm 133 133
Firm-Year Observations 886 886
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients reported.  Standard errors are in parentheses, and are robust and clustered at the firm level.
NERC region dummies included as controls.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
†Effects are significant at p < 0.10; coefficients and standard errors shown have been rounded.
aThese variables are mean centered. 
bThese variables are standardized to z-scores. 
c0 replaced by 0.1 to be able to take the log.
dWinsorized at 5% tails; results stable without winsorizing.
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Results
We present the pooled OLS estimation results in Table 5.  In
the main effects model, we find INTER to be positively asso-
ciated with ROAt+1 (β = 0.004, p < 0.01).  In the interaction
effects model, we find a positive effect of INTER × MSI on
ROAt+1 (β = 0.011, p < 0.01), supporting H1, and a negative
effect of INTRA × MSI on ROAt+1 (β = -0.016, p < 0.05),
supporting H2.
Interaction Plots and Economic Significance
To better understand the (mis)fit relationships, we followed
Aiken and West’s (1991) recommendation and plotted the
significant interactions (see Figure 3).  We observe increases
in INTER positively impact ROAt+1 when MSI is high (Figure
3a).  When firm i in year t is one standard deviation above the
industry mean in its investments to develop interfirm process
integration capability (i.e., z = 1 for INTER) and increases
reliance in that year by 10 percent on the wholesale market
for electricity it sells to customers (i.e., 0.1 increase in MSI),
then in the next year it realizes a 0.11 percent increase in
ROA (β × INTER × MSI = 0.011 × 1 × 0.1 = 0.0011).  In
contrast, we observe that increases in INTRA decrease ROAt+1
to a greater extent when MSI is high than when it is low
(Figure 3b).  When firm i in year t is one standard deviation
above the industry mean in its investments to develop intra-
firm process integration capability (i.e., z = 1 for INTRA) and
increases reliance in that year by 10 percent on the wholesale
market for electricity that it sells to customers (i.e., 0.1
increase in MSI), then in the next year it realizes a 0.16
percent decrease in ROA (β × INTRA × MSI = -0.016 × 1 ×
0.1 = -0.0016).
Robustness Tests
Fixed and Random Effects Estimations:  We evaluated the
robustness of the pooled OLS estimation results using fixed
effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimations and found
the results to be robust.  The results for the FE and RE
estimations are provided in Appendix A.
       
Endogeneity Test for MSI:  In addition to lagging forward
ROA to mitigate endogeneity concerns and evaluating the
robustness of the OLS estimations using FE estimation, we
evaluated if MSI was endogenous using the XTIVREG2 two-
step GMM procedure in Stata (Schaffer 2005).  We identified
the following three instruments for MSI:  deregulation shock,
log of the total number of production plants for a firm lagged
one year (Log of Total Plantst-1), and investments in modular
interfirm systems of the firm lagged one year
(INTER_MODt-1).  These instruments satisfy the prerequisites
of being relevant theoretically and exogenous (Greene 2007). 
The results indicate that MSI is not endogenous (p > 0.07),
the overidentifying restriction is satisfied (Hasen J = 0.12, p >
0.9), and the instruments are strong (partial R-squared = 0.12,
joint significance of instruments F-statistic = 12.39, p <
0.001) and valid (Anderson-Rubin Wald F-statistic = 0.06,
p > 0.9) (Anderson and Rubin 1949).  See Appendix B for
details.
Additional Firm Performance Measures:  We evaluated the
effects of the interactions between MSI and the development
of the IT-enabled process integration capabilities on two other
firm performance measures:   Tobin’s Qt+1 and operating
revenue/total assetst+1.  These measures capture market
valuation and operational performance, respectively, and have
been used in IT business value studies (e.g., Bharadwaj 2000;
Bharadwaj et al. 1999; Santhanam and Hartono 2003;
Tanriverdi et al. 2007).  We find support for H1 using both
Tobin’s Qt+1 and operating revenue/total assets t+1 but do not
find support for H2 with these additional performance
measures.  The results for these estimations are provided in
Appendix A. 
Summary of Results:  Table 6 provides a summary of the
pooled OLS results with ROA as the measure of firm perfor-
mance, the robustness results with ROA as the measure of
firm performance and using FE and RE estimations, and the
robustness results with Tobin’s Q and operating revenue/total
assets as additional measures of firm performance.  We find
H1 and H2 to be supported for all ROA models, and H1to be
also supported for the Tobin’s Q and operating revenue/total
assets models.
Winsorized Analysis:  As firm performance can have extreme
values, we winsorized the top and bottom 20 observations13
(Kaplan and Zingales 1997).  All results were robust to
winsorizing the dependent variables.
Discussion
Our findings in the EUI context support our hypotheses that
fit between the development of interfirm process integration
capability and increases in MSI accrues performance benefits
and misfit between the development of intrafirm process inte-
gration capability and increases in MSI extracts performance
penalties.  Our results have implications for our understanding
about the creation of business value from investments in IT-
enabled process integration capabilities and the management
of plural sourcing.
13We replaced the 20 highest and lowest values of the dependent variables by
the next value counting inward from the extremes (Barnett and Lewis 1994).
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Figure 3.  Interaction Effects
Table 6.  Summary of Results
Primary
Test Robustness Tests
Firm Performance  ROAt+1 ROAt+1 Tobin’s Qt+1 Oper. Rev/Assetst+1
Estimation Method  OLS FE RE FE OLS
H1:  INTER × MSI (+) (+) S (+) S (+) S (+) S (+) S
H2:  INTRA × MSI (-) (-) S (-) S (-) S (+) NS (+) NS
FE favored to RE? No Yes No
RE favored to Pooled OLS? No Yes No
Conclusion Support for H1 & H2 Support for H1 Support for H1
Notes: S indicates a significant coefficient, NS indicates a nonsignificant coefficient.
Coefficient signs shown in parentheses.
Theoretical Implications
By surfacing how the interdependencies between investments
in IT-enabled process integration capabilities and plural
sourcing can either create or erode business value, we
contribute to the IT business value and IT capabilities litera-
tures (e.g., Bharadwaj 2000; Bharadwaj et al. 1999; Bharad-
waj et al. 2007; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000; Mithas et al.
2012; Mithas et al. 2013; Rai et al. 2006; Rai and Tang 2010). 
Additionally, by showing that firm performance is impacted
by the interaction of IT-enabled process integration capa-
bilities and plural sourcing, we contribute to our under-
standing of the complementary roles of the TCE and the
capabilities perspectives in explaining firm performance.  We
elaborate on these theoretical contributions below.
We extend past work that has shown IT-enabled interfirm
process integration capability creates business value (Barua
et al. 2004; Bharadwaj et al. 2007; Rai et al. 2006) by
surfacing that gains in firm performance from investing in this
capability are contingent on plural sourcing, or a firm’s
reliance on the market relative to internal production (Heide
2003; Parmigiani 2007).  Our results reveal that a firm
realizes gains in ROA when it complements increases in
investments to develop interfirm process integration capa-
bility with increases in MSI (Figure 3a).  Our robustness tests
with additional firm performance measures also reveal that a
firm realizes gains in both Tobin’s Q and operating revenue/
total assets when it complements increases in investments to
develop interfirm process integration capability with increases
in MSI.  When a firm invests in developing IT-enabled inter-
firm process integration capability, it allocates scarce
resources to observe consumption and predict demand at
granular levels (e.g., individual customers or customer micro-
segments) and to align supply with demand by dynamically
sourcing from markets.  Our results show that these IT invest-
ments create greater business value—assessed in terms of
profitability, market valuation, and asset turnover—for a firm
when its plural sourcing choices make the role of coordinating
transactions in the market more salient relative to internal
production.
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Our study also reveals that when a firm reduces internal
production relative to market sourcing, its investments in
developing intrafirm coordination IT capability exact pen-
alties in business value.  Specifically, we find a firm’s invest-
ments in developing intrafirm process integration capability
to negatively impact ROA when it increases reliance on
sourcing from the market relative to internal production
(Figure 3b).  When a firm increases sourcing from the market
relative to internal production, it reduces the value-creating
role of the firm’s hierarchy and authority to coordinate
internal production relative to the value-creating role of the
firm’s capabilities to coordinate transactions in the market. 
As such, a sourcing decision to increase reliance on the
market relative to internal production is inconsistent with the
decision to invest in developing IT-enabled intrafirm process
integration capability, and leads to a reduction in firm
profitability.  This finding contributes to the emerging under-
standing on how a firm’s IT-enabled intrafirm process
integration initiatives together with its other strategic choices
affect different aspects of business value creation.  In our
robustness tests using additional firm performance measures,
we did not detect a firm realizing a market valuation penalty
for the misfit between developing intrafirm process integra-
tion capability and increasing emphasis on the market relative
to internal production.  A firm may not be penalized in market
valuation for this misalignment in a given time period because
of the expectation that the level of reliance on internal
production relative to the market can increase in future time
periods.  We also did not detect a decline in operating
revenue/total assets, conceivably because price controls and
asset-intensive internal production in the EUI mitigate the
adverse effects of misalignment between IT investments in
process integration and plural sourcing decisions.  As such, a
firm’s development of IT-enabled process integration capa-
bility to organize production internally (e.g., control and
coordinate its distributed production assets) is a mismatch
with its increased reliance on the market relative to internal
production to fulfill demand, and this mismatch exacts a
penalty with respect to the firm’s profitability.
Collectively, our findings reveal how explanations of firm
capabilities for IT-enabled process integration and TCE for
plural sourcing interact to explain firm performance.  Inte-
grating the viewpoints that internal costs of organizing
production and transaction costs need to be considered in
making governance choices (Masten et al. 1991) and a firm’s
capabilities and governance choices are interdependent
(Jacobides and Winter 2005; Madhok 2002; Poppo and
Zenger 1998), we show that the business value of a firm’s
investments in developing IT-enabled process integration
capabilities is influenced by fit and misfit with the firm’s
plural sourcing strategy.  Our findings support Williamson’s
(1999) observation that an integrated perspective of firm
competencies and TCE provides a more complete explanation
of how to organize transactions effectively than either the firm
competencies or TCE perspectives individually.  In sum, our
study elaborates the theoretical explanations on how IT
creates business value from a capabilities perspective, with a
focus on how IT resources and capabilities can be effectively
combined with non-IT resources and capabilities (Aral and
Weill 2007; Bharadwaj et al. 2007; Tambe et al. 2012), to an
integrated capabilities-governance perspective, with a focus
on the discriminating alignment between capabilities and
governance of transactions.
Implications for Practice
Our study suggests that IT executives and sourcing managers
can collaborate to create synergies between investments in IT-
enabled process integration capabilities and plural sourcing
choices.  They need to recognize that the business value a
firm can extract from its IT investments in process integration
is a function of its reliance on the market relative to internal
production for the sourcing of goods/services.  Consequently,
they need to establish collaborative processes to dynamically
align decisions to invest in IT-enabled process integration
systems and to engage in the plural sourcing of goods/
services.
Given the potential to leverage advances in IT to innovate
how a firm organizes internal production of a good/service
and how it transacts in the market for the good/service, IT
executives need to allocate IT investments in innovating these
processes while considering the sourcing choices of their
firms.  They need to recognize that there are significant
consequences to the fit or misfit between IT investments in
developing process integration capabilities and MSI.  On the
one hand, IT investments in developing interfirm process
integration capability while increasing MSI are likely to
increase firm profitability, market valuation and asset turn-
over.  On the other hand, IT investments in developing
intrafirm IT capabilities while increasing MSI are likely to
extract penalties in firm profitability.  By coordinating IT
investment and sourcing decisions, IT executives can create
business value and avoid performance penalties from IT
investments directed at innovating interfirm and intrafirm
processes.
Limitations and Future Research
Our focus on the EUI enabled us to mitigate confounds due to
cross-industry differences (e.g., electricity is a homogeneous
product), define a context-appropriate measure of MSI, obtain
granular data on actual IT investments that were reported to
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federal agencies and code them based on the characteristics of
the technology, isolate regulatory and unplanned shocks, and
create a rich panel dataset on MSI, development of IT-enabled
process integration capabilities, firm performance, and a range
of control variables at the industry, regional, and firm levels. 
Although these features provide a strong basis for confidence
in our results, we recognize that our coding scheme, while
carefully developed and extensively validated, is subject to
the limitation of the level of description that is provided by
firms in their FERC filings.  Future research, which uses
primary and archival data on sourcing choices and types of IT
investments to develop IT capabilities across industry con-
texts, can evaluate the robustness of our findings and their
generalizability to other contexts. 
As the EUI is characterized by high intensity of capital assets,
caution should be exercised in extrapolating the findings
outside of comparable asset-intensive industries (e.g., airlines,
military complexes, logistics, and transportation).  Although
the EUI has witnessed major deregulation, it is regulated on
some important competitive parameters (e.g., prices, market
reach, service reliability, scope of transactions for firms in
power generation, transmission, and distribution).  Moreover,
electricity is the perfect commodity that cannot be easily
inventoried.  Consequently, for electric utility firms in the
power-generation segment, increasing MSI requires the ability
to dynamically coordinate supply with demand.  Accordingly,
we conceptualized customer-facing systems for demand man-
agement and supplier-facing systems for supply management
as constitutive elements of an overall IT-enabled interfirm
process integration capability and examined its fit with MSI. 
Future research can relax the regulatory and product condi-
tions that characterize the EUI, conceptualize a corresponding
set of more granular interfirm IT capabilities (e.g.,
distribution-facing and supplier-facing) for these other con-
texts, and examine the (mis)alignment between these interfirm
IT capabilities and plural sourcing choices.  It can also
examine the relative importance of IT-enabled supply-side
process integration capability and IT-enabled customer-side
process integration capability when demand and supply do not
need to be aligned as responsively as is required in the EUI
context.  Finally, future research can examine how the formu-
lation and enactment of decisions pertaining to sourcing of
goods/services and investments in IT process integration
coevolve and the resulting performance consequences. 
Conclusion
Our study, situated in the EUI, unpacks the performance
consequences of a firm achieving discriminating alignment
between IT-enabled process integration capabilities and MSI,
or the extent of reliance on the market relative to internal
production for sourcing a good/service.  When a firm achieves
fit by developing IT-enabled interfirm process integration
capability and increasing MSI, it creates business value by
increasing profitability, market valuation, and asset turnover. 
In contrast, when a firm falls into misfit by developing IT-
enabled intrafirm process integration capability and increasing
MSI, it loses business value by incurring penalties in
profitability.  Our study reveals that IT business value is
better understood through an integrated capabilities-gover-
nance perspective than through a capabilities or governance
perspective in isolation.  We hope our study will stimulate
exploration of how the interdependence of specific IT capa-
bilities and governance choices influences accounting-based
and market-based measures of firm performance in different
product-market and regulatory contexts.
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Appendix A
Additional Estimations for the ROA Models and Other
Firm Performance Measures
In addition to the pooled OLS estimations with ROA t+1 as the measure of firm performance that are reported in the paper, we estimated the
models using random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) specifications.  The RE and FE results, which are reported in Table A1, were consistent
with the pooled OLS results and supported H1 and H2.
We also evaluated our hypotheses using two additional firm performance measures:  Tobin’s Q, which is the total dollar amount market value
divided by the total dollar amount replacement value of a firm in a given year) and operating revenue/total assets, which is the total dollar
amount of revenue divided by total dollar amount of assets of a firm in a given year.  We selected these measures because Tobin’s Q provides
a forward-looking market measure and operating revenue/total assets provides an operating efficiency assessment (Bharadwaj 2000; Bharadwaj
et al. 1999).  For the Tobin’s Q and operating revenue/total assets models, we employed the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
against the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the RE estimator are not systematically different than those of the OLS estimator
(Bruesch and Pagan 1980).  The test failed to reject the null hypothesis for the operating revenues/total assetst+1 model, supporting pooled OLS
estimation over RE, and rejected the null hypothesis for the Tobin’s Qt+1 model (χ² = 2.784, p < 0.01), supporting RE estimation over OLS
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estimation.  We then examined if FE or RE estimation is to be favored for the Tobin’s Qt+1 model.  As we use robust standard errors, we
conducted the over-identification test using the Sargan-Hansen statistic against the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient
RE estimator are not systematically different from the ones estimated by the consistent FE estimator (Wooldridge 2002).1  We rejected this
null hypothesis for the Tobin’s Q t+1 model (χ² = 122.14, p < 0.001), supporting FE estimation over RE estimation.  The FE results for the
Tobin’s Qt+1 model 
2
 and the OLS results for the operating revenue/total assetst+1 model are provided in Table A1.  Consistent with the results
using ROA as the measure of firm performance, we find support for H1 (INTER × MSI) using Tobin’s Q and operating revenue/total assets
as measures of firm performance.  However, unlike the results using ROA as the measure of firm performance, we do not find support for H2
(INTRA × MSI) using Tobin’s Q and operating revenue/total assets as measures of firm performance.
Table A1.  Robustness Results for the ROA Models and With Other Firm Performance Measures 
Dependent
Variables  ROAt+1 ROAt+1 Tobin’s Qt+1
Operating
Revenue/Assetst+1
Estimation  Random Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS
Models  Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction
ROA
0.536*** 0.540*** 0.175** 0.185**
(0.071) (0.068) (0.074) (0.073)
Tobin’s Q 
0.388*** 0.385***
(0.095) (0.096)
Oper Rev/
Assetsb 
0.797*** 0.797***
(0.040) (0.040)
MSIa 
-0.005* -0.006* -0.007 -0.006 -0.156** -0.156** -0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.075) (0.075) (0.088) (0.087)
INTERb 
0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.004* -0.008 -0.017**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007)
INTRAb
-0.001 -0.003** -0.001† -0.003*** -0.011* -0.004 -0.020** -0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.023)
INTERb × MSIa
0.011*** 0.016*** 0.017** 0.039**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.018)
INTRAb × MSIa
-0.017** -0.016*** 0.050 0.056
(0.008) (0.005) (0.053) (0.103)
INTER_MODb 
0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
INTRA_MODb
-0.002*** -0.002** -0.003** -0.002* -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
IT
Customizationb
0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.013* 0.009 0.028** 0.027**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
1We used the XTOVERID program (version 2.1.6; 2Nov2011) by Schaffer and Stillman  (2006) for the Stata software package.  We also conducted the Hausman
test with FE and RE specifications without robust standard errors, as the Hausman test is only applicable when the models are not specified with robust standard
errors (Hayashi 2000, p. 234, note 18).  The Hausman test suggests that the FE estimation should be preferred over RE estimation.
2 As a FE specification of “Small T and Large N” (few time periods and many firms) that includes lagged dependent variable on the right-hand-side of the equation
can produce biased estimates (Roodman 2009), we employed dynamic panel estimation to further examine the Tobin’s Qt+1 model.  We used the XTABOND2
Stata procedure for the Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover
1995; Blundell and Bond 1998).  As with the FE results, we observed the System GMM results to support H1 and not H2.  
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Table A1.  Robustness Results for the ROA Models and With Other Firm Performance Measures
(Continued) 
Dependent
Variables  ROAt+1 ROAt+1 Tobin’s Qt+1
Operating
Revenue/Assetst+1
Estimation  Random Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled OLS
Models  Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction Main Interaction
IT
Infrastructureb
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001† -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.012** -0.012*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Supplier
Concentration
-0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.017 -0.018 0.053 0.054
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.034) (0.034) (0.083) (0.084)
Oil Crisis Shock
0.003 0.002 0.005** 0.005** -0.028* -0.025 0.058 0.059
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.017) (0.017) (0.036) (0.036)
Depreciation
Expensesb
0.000 0.000 -0.001† -0.001† -0.001 -0.003 0.011 0.010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012)
Firm Ageb, c
0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 0.038 0.038
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.049) (0.050) (0.027) (0.027)
Production
Capacityb, d
0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.011 0.009 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.014) (0.031) (0.031)
CWIP_Otherb
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002* -0.015 -0.014 -0.012 -0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014)
Constant
0.025*** 0.025*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.603*** 0.607*** 0.070*** 0.070***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.083) (0.084) (0.025) (0.024)
F-statistic 13.010** 14.920*** 3.601*** 10.824*** 8.155*** 74.724*** 46.242*** 66.724***
Firms 121 121 133 133 109 109 113 113
Firm-Year
Observations
805 805 886 886 687 687 762 762
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients reported.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Robust standard errors used, clustered at the firm level for
OLS and RE estimations. 
Dummies included for NERC region of a firm in models that were not FE estimations.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***  < 0.01.
†Effects are significant at p < 0.10; coefficients and standard errors shown have been rounded.
aThese variables are mean centered. 
bThese variables are standardized to z-scores. 
c0 replaced by 0.1 to be able to take the log.
dWinsorized at 5% tails; results stable without winsorizing.
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Appendix B
Endogeneity Assessment of MSI Using Two-Step
Generalized Method of Moments
We used the XTIVREG2 two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure in Stata (Schaffer 2005) to evaluate if MSI was
endogenous in the ROA model.  The results are summarized in Table B1.  We briefly describe the two-stage process that we employed.
Stage 1:  We estimated MSI using the following three instrumental variables (Deregulation Shock, Log Total Plantst-1, INTER_MODt-1).  We
also included the following variables in estimating MSI:  INTER, INTRA, IT customization, IT Infrastructure, Supplier Concentration, Oil
Crisis Shock, Depreciation Expenses, Firm Age, Production Capacity, and CWIP_Other.
Stage 2:  We included the MSI estimates in Stage 2, with ROA as the dependent variable.  However, we did not include the interactions (MSI
× INTRA/INTER) for the following reasons:   There are two ways to go about including interaction terms with the endogenous variable in our
specification.  First, if Y is the endogenous variable, X1 is the exogenous variable, and Y × X1 is to be included in the second stage, then in
the first stage the excluded instrument (Z) needs to be interacted as Z × X1.  We have three excluded instruments, requiring the addition of six
interaction terms in Stage 1 (the three excluded instruments interacted with INTER and INTRA, respectively).  When we included these six
interaction terms in Stage 1, the models suffered from excessive multicollinearity and did not converge.  Second, one can include instrumental
variables in Stage 1 that correlate only with the interaction term but not with the variables that comprise the interaction terms.  We are not aware
of any instrumental variables to make this inclusion feasible.  Furthermore, the results suggest that MSI is not endogenously determined, which
makes us more confident about our approach.
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Table B1.  Endogeneity Assessment of MSI for ROAt+1 (Two-Step GMM)
Variables First Stage Second Stage
ROA
0.754* 0.099
(0.440) (0.076)
MSIa
 0.004
 (0.022)
INTERb
0.005 0.003** 
(0.004) (0.002)
INTRAb
0.003 -0.002** 
(0.006) (0.001)
INTER_MODb
-0.002 -0.001†
(0.003) (0.001)
INTRA_MODb
-0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.002)
IT Customizationb
-0.009 0.001
(0.007) (0.001)
IT Infrastructureb
-0.005 -0.001
(0.004) (0.001)
Supplier Concentration
0.039 -0.002
(0.059) (0.005)
Oil Crisis Shock
-0.009 0.005
(0.106) (0.005)
Depreciation Expensesb
-0.003 -0.001
(0.009) (0.001)
Firm Ageb, c
0.007 -0.007
(0.008) (0.007)
Production Capacityb, d
-0.082*** -0.001
(0.030) (0.004)
CWIP_Otherb
0.003 -0.005** 
(0.006) (0.002)
INTER_MODt-1
b 0.020***  
(0.003)
Deregulation Shock
0.004  
(0.005)
Log Total Plantst-1
-0.064**  
(0.031)  
F-statistic 5.839*** 6.921***
Log-likelihood 750.878 2127.639
Firms 130 130
Firm-Year Observations 758 758
Partial R² of excluded instruments 0.121
Test of excluded instruments (F-statistic) 12.39***
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Table B1.  Endogeneity Assessment of MSI for ROAt+1 (Two-Step GMM)
(Continued)
Underidentification tests
Ho:  matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank = K1-1
(underidentified)
Ha:  matrix has rank = K1 (identified)
       Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (χ²)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic (χ²)
21.28***
38.22***
Weak identification test   
Ho:  equation is weakly identified
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 12.39*** 
Weak-instrument-robust inference  
Tests of joint significance of endogenous regressors B1 in main
equation
Ho:  B1 = 0 and overidentifying restrictions are valid
Anderson-Rubin Wald test  F-statistic
Anderson-Rubin Wald test  χ²
Stock-Wright LM S statistic  χ²
0.06 (p-value  >0.90)
0.17 (p-value > 0.90)
0.15 (p-value > 0.90)
Hansen J statistic (χ²) (overidentification test of all instruments) 0.12 (p-value > 0.90)
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressor (MSI)
Number of regressors
Number of instruments 
Number of excluded instruments
Instrumented
0.15 (p-value > 0.70)
14
16
3
MSI
Excluded instruments Dereg. Shock,
INTER_MODt-1
b,
lnTotalPlants t-1 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients reported.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****p < 0.001; 
†Effects are significant at p < 0.10; coefficients and standard errors shown are rounded.
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
aThese variables are mean centered.
bThese variables are standardized to z-scores. 
c0 replaced by 0.1 to be able to take the log.
dWinsorized at 5% tails; results stable without winsorizing.
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